Summary of Rubio v. State, 124 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 87 by Cheong, Holly
Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law
Nevada Supreme Court Summaries Law Journals
10-30-2008
Summary of Rubio v. State, 124 Nev. Adv. Op. No.
87
Holly Cheong
Nevada Law Journal
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons
This Case Summary is brought to you by Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law, an institutional repository administered by the Wiener-Rogers Law
Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please contact david.mcclure@unlv.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cheong, Holly, "Summary of Rubio v. State, 124 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 87" (2008). Nevada Supreme Court Summaries. Paper 398.
http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs/398
Rubio v. State, 124 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 87 (Oct. 30, 2008)1 
 
CRIMINAL LAW – INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
 
Summary 
 
 Appeal from a district court order denying relief for ineffective assistance in a 
criminal case resulting in deportation. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 Affirmed the district court order denying relief for ineffective assistance by an 
interpreter but reversed and remanded the district court order denying relief for 
ineffective assistance by counsel. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 Rubio is a Mexican native that has resided in Las Vegas with her husband and 
four children as a lawful permanent resident of the United States since 1999.  Two of her 
children have cerebral palsy and require special care.  On September 29, 2005, she rear-
ended her husband’s car when she observed him driving the car in the company of 
another woman.  Rubio was arrested and charged with one count of battery with the use 
of a deadly weapon. 
 On February 13, 2006, Rubio met with her court-appointed public defender who 
presented her with a plea agreement written in English.  Rubio is not fluent in English so 
Rubio met with a Spanish-language interpreter, who read the agreement to Rubio in 
Spanish.  Rubio then signed the agreement, pleading guilty to the offense in exchange for 
a lesser sentence. 
 The plea agreement included language explaining the possible immigration 
consequences.  It also contained standard language indicating that she was signing the 
agreement voluntarily and that her attorney answered all her questions regarding the plea 
agreement to her satisfaction.  
 Rubio told the district court that she understood that plea agreement, discussed the 
rights she was waiving with her attorney, had no questions, and had signed the agreement 
freely and voluntarily.  The district court sentenced her to probation for up to three years 
and required, as a condition of probation, that Rubio comply with Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) directives. 
 After Rubio’s conviction, she was taken into custody by Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony.2  While the 
immigration court proceedings were pending, Rubio filed a motion in district court to 
withdraw her guilty plea, arguing that she entered the agreement involuntarily without 
effective assistance of counsel. In January 2007, Rubio was removed to Mexico. 
                                                 
1 By Holly Cheong 
2 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2006) which allows the INS to deport aliens convicted of aggravated 
felonies. 
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 In her affidavit supporting the motion, Rubio claimed that she never discussed the 
plea agreement with counsel and thought that the court interpreter would provide proper 
advice.  According to Rubio, counsel referred her to the court interpreter and counsel was 
not present during the translation of the agreement. Also, Rubio claimed that the court 
interpreter did not interpret the entire document and when Rubio asked the interpreter 
about immigration consequences, the interpreter replied that Rubio should be fine as long 
as she has papers.  Rubio claimed that she was rushed into signing the agreement and if 
she had been given the opportunity to discuss the agreement with counsel, she would not 
have signed the agreement. Rubio also included information regarding her children’s 
special care needs in her affidavit. 
 The district court denied the motion stating that the court had no control over the 
INS, Rubio knew that there were immigration consequences with accepting the plea 
agreement, and that an interpreter cannot provide ineffective assistance. 
 In a per curiam decision, the court affirmed that an interpreter cannot provide 
ineffective assistance through affirmative misrepresentation but reversed and remanded 
the district court decision, requiring an evidentiary trial to consider Rubio’s ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims. 
 
Discussion 
 
Standard of review 
 
 The court discussed the standard of review, stating that a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel is a de novo review but deference will be given to the district 
court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous and not supported by substantial 
evidence.3  The court also discussed burden of proof, stating that the defendant bears the 
burden of proof to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that “the plea was not 
entered knowingly or voluntarily.”4  A guilty plea is entered into knowingly and 
voluntarily only if the defendant has “a full understanding of both the nature of the 
charges and the direct consequences arising from a plea of guilty.”5  The district court 
must look beyond the hearing and evaluate the totality of the circumstances in order to 
make the determination.6  A motion to withdraw a guilty plea may be granted in order to 
correct a manifest injustice through ineffective assistance of counsel or “failure to 
adequately inform a defendant of the consequences of his plea.”7   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Lader v. Warden, 120 P.3d 1164, 1166 (Nev. 2005) (citing Kirksey v. State, 923 P.2d 1102, 1107 (Nev. 
1996)). 
4 Foster v. State, 111 P.3d 1083, 1086 (Nev. 2005); Barajas v. State, 991 P.2d 474, 475 (Nev. 1999). 
5 Little v. Warden, 34 P.3d 540, 543 (Nev. 2001). 
6 Id. at 544; Barajas, 991 P.2d at 475 (citing Bryant v. State, 721 P.2d 364, 368 (Nev. 1986)). 
7 Barajas, 991 P.2d at 442; Paine v. State, 877 P.2d 1025, 1031 (Nev. 1994) overruled on other grounds by 
Leslie v. Warden, 59 P.3d 440, 445-46 (Nev. 2002).  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.165 (governing a motion 
to withdraw a guilty plea); United States v. Signori, 844 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1988). 
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Ineffective assistance of counsel 
 
 The court stated that effective assistance of counsel is guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment of the Constitution.8  The court also applied the two-prong Strickland test, 
which requires “that [her] counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and [the plaintiff] suffered prejudice as a result” in order to determine 
there was ineffective assistance of counsel.9   
 
Deportation is collateral consequence, generally not affecting the validity of a guilty plea 
 
 The court stated that immigration issues are collateral consequences of a guilty 
plea and do not affect the voluntariness of the plea.10  As a general rule, counsel’s failure 
to inform the defendant of collateral consequences is not objectively unreasonable and, 
therefore, does not meet the first prong of the Strickland test for ineffective assistance.11  
However, Barajas did not address the issue of affirmative misrepresentation of 
immigration issues.12 
 
We adopt the affirmative misrepresentation exception to the collateral consequence rule 
 
 Both the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals have adopted an affirmative 
misrepresentation exception for deportation, holding that affirmative misrepresentation 
regarding immigration consequences may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.13  
The court found the reasoning of the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals to be 
persuasive and adopted the affirmative misrepresentation exception to the collateral 
consequence rule.  However, the court held that an evidentiary hearing is required 
invalidate a guilty plea for affirmative misrepresentation.  The defendant still bears the 
burden to demonstrate affirmative misrepresentation, making counsel’s performance 
unreasonable, and prejudice in order to meet both prongs of the Strickland test for 
ineffective assistance. 
 
Rubio did not clearly establish affirmative misrepresentation 
 
 However, the court declined to extend the affirmative misrepresentation rule to 
the facts in this case because the affirmative misrepresentation came from the interpreter, 
                                                 
8 Larson v. State, 766 P.2d 261, 262 n.6 (Nev. 1988) (citing Turner v. State of Tenn., 858 F.2d 1201 (6th 
Cir. 1998), vacated on other grounds, 492 U.S. 902 (1989) (“[c]onstitution guarantees effective counsel 
when rejecting a plea offer”); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (“[c]onstitution guarantees 
effective counsel when accepting guilty plea”)). 
9 Avery v. State, 129 P.3d 664, 669 (Nev. 2006) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Kirksey v. State, 923 P.2d 1102, 1107 (Nev. 1996); Warden 
v. Lyons, 683 P.2d 504 (Nev. 1984)). 
10 Barajas, 991 P.2d at 475. 
11 Id. at 476 (citing United States v. Banda, 1 F.3d 354, 356 (5th Cir. 1993)). 
12 Id. at 476 n.1. 
13 United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 
187 (2d Cir. 2002). 
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not the attorney.  The court held that the exception only applies to the relationship 
between attorney and client. 
 
Rubio’s claims regarding counsel’s assistance during the plea process warrant an 
evidentiary hearing 
 
 A court must consider the totality of the circumstances in determine whether “a 
defendant entered a guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily.”14  An evidentiary hearing 
may be necessary to determine any constitutional issues.15  If the defendant’s claims are 
not supported by the record, then the district court can reject the claims without an 
evidentiary hearing.16  The court found that although the formal plea agreement 
contained a statement noting that the plea may carry immigration consequences, the 
district court did not ask whether counsel reviewed the entire plea agreement with Ru
or if the information regarding the possible immigration consequences was translated for
Rubio. Therefore, the court could not determine if Rubio’s claims were unsupported 
the record.  If the nonlegally trained interpreter was the only person who reviewed the 
plea agreement with Rubio, that act may violate due process and meet the first prong of
the Strickland te
bio 
 
by 
 
st. 
 The court could also not determine if Rubio suffered prejudice, the second prong 
of the Strickland test, because the district court did not consider the condition of Rubio’s 
children and the role that their condition might have played in Rubio’s decision.  Because 
of the condition of her children, it is possible that Rubio would have opted for trial 
instead of a guilty plea if she was informed of the possible risks of deportation associated 
with pleading guilty.  The court held that the district court abused its discretion by not 
conducting an evidentiary hearing. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The court adopted the affirmative misrepresentation exception for the collateral 
consequence rule regarding deportation and ineffective assistance, but held that the 
exception did not apply to Rubio because the misrepresentation regarding deportation 
risks did not come from counsel.  However, the court held that the district court abused 
its discretion by not conducting an evidentiary hearing on Rubio’s claims that her counsel 
abandoned her and that she was prejudiced by the lack of legal advice.  The court 
therefore affirmed the district court’s order regarding the interpreter’s ineffective 
assistance but reversed and remanded the district court’s order regarding Rubio’s 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, instructing the district court to hold an 
evidentiary hearing on those claims. 
                                                 
14 Little v. Warden, 34 P.3d 540, 544 (Nev. 2001). 
15 Id. 
16 See Hargrove v. State, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (Nev. 1984). 
